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SCAPEGOAT PICKETING: BEYOND THE PALE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
Scapegoat picketing' is the picketing of a private business or private
individual2 with whom the picketers have no dispute. 3 Its sole purpose is to
1. Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 31, 1979), aff'd, Nos.
380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 99 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1980).
"Scapegoat boycotting urges concerted refusal to have business relationships with a 'target'
consisting of a limited number of persons, for the purpose of protesting against and symbolizing
protest against the actions and conduct of third parties .... As to the 'target' the sole purpose of
the boycott is to cause damage, injury and destruction for symbolic purposes. In a true scapegoat
boycott the 'target' has no power or authority to force concessions from the third parties. In a true
scapegoat boycott there is no real or bona fide dispute, primary or secondary, between the 'target'
and the boycotters." Id., slip op. at 24 (emphasis omitted). It is apparent that this definition of
scapegoat boycotting pertains only to picketing. This was implied in the Superior Court's
affirmance by its statement that the injunction was limited to the area of the picketing. Nos. 380,
390, 444, slip op. at 2. Other methods of protest, such as handbilling and leafletting, cannot be
enjoined. See Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938). Compare Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D.
Mo. 1979) (leafletting urging boycott of unrelated third parties held unenjoinable) with West
Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (picketing of
uninvolved third party held enjoinable).
"A picketer may: (1) Merely observe workers or customers. (2) Communicate information, e.g.,
that a strike is in progress, making either true, untrue or libelous statements. (3) Persuade
employees or customers not to engage in relations with the employer: (a) through the use of
banners, without speaking, carrying, true, untrue or libelous legends; (b) by speaking, (i) in it
calm, dispassionate manner, (ii) in a heated, hostile manner, (iii) using abusive epithets and
profanity, (iv) yelling loudly, (v) by persisting in making arguments when employees or customers
refuse to listen; (c) by offering money or similar inducements to strike breakers. (4) Threaten
employees or customers: (a) by the mere presence of the picketer; the presence may be a threat of,
(i) physical violence, (ii) social ostracism, being branded in the community as a 'scab,' (Iii) a trade
or employees' boycott, i.e., preventing workers from securing employment and refusing to trade
with customers, (iv) threatening injury to property; (b) by verbal threats. (5) Assaults and use of
violence. (6) Destruction of property. (7) Blocking of entrances and interference with traffic."
Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N.C. L. Rev. 158, 186 n. 135 (1931). See also
M. Forkosch, A Treatise on Labor Law § 262 (2d ed. 1965); C. Gregory & H. Katz, Labor and
the Law 141 (3d ed. 1979); B. Zepke, Labor Law 100 (1977); Hersbergen, Picketing By Aggrieved
Consumers-A Case Law Analysis, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 1097, 1099 (1974).
2. The picketing of public officials is beyond the scope of this Note. The public person has
sacrificed, at least partially, his right to privacy. Furthermore, the rights of public protest and
criticism would be significantly diminished if public officials were immune from picketing. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally Comment, Picketers
at the Doorstep, 9 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 95, 121-22 (1974); Note, Picketing The Homes of
Public Officials, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 106, 119-23 (1966).
3. The key factor distinguishing scapegoat picketing from other forms of picketing is that
there is no dispute, specifically or generally, between the scapegoat picketers and their target. A
comparison of Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 31, 1979), qa'd,
Nos. 380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 99 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23,
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cause economic damage and destruction to the "target" to symbolize a protest
against the actions of unrelated third parties. 4 Unlike labor relations5 or
consumer picketing, 6 scapegoat picketing is directed at a target that has no
"involvement in or any control over or power to affect the primary disputes
between the protestors and the third parties." 7
In general, because picketing is viewed as a form of communication
protected by the first amendment,8 there is some question whether scapegoat
1980), and Claiborne Hardware, Inc. v. NAACP, No. 78,353 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Aug. 9, 1978), %vill
illustrate this distinction. In Rouse, the picketers conceded that their dispute was not with the
shopping center; rather, they were urging others to boycott the stores to symbolize criticism of
government policies. No. 4145, slip op. at 21. In Claiborne, the picketing and boycotting of
white merchants was in response to systematic racial discrimination against blacks- No. 78,353.
slip op. at 11. Thus, although there was no dispute between the picketers and their target in
Rouse, there were general allegations of discrimination charged against the target merchants in
Claiborne, and hence, a dispute between the protestors and their target. No. 78,353, slip op.
at 16. The scapegoat picketing may be on the private property of the target, or on the public
property adjacent to it. In the latter case, the protest must be directed at the private property
with whom there is no dispute to be classified as scapegoat picketing. See No. 4145, slip op. at
21-23.
4. Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145, slip op. at 24. A scapegoat is "an animal or
person to whom sins, ill luck, or other evils are ceremonially attached and who symbolically bears
them away by being sacrificed," or "a person or thing bearing the blame for others," or "a person,
group, race, or institution against whom is directed the irrational hostility and unrelieved
aggression of others." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2025 (1976).
5. Picketing is often used by employees and labor organizations to establish collective
bargaining relationships, to publicize unfair labor practices or substandard working conditions,
and to exert economic pressure upon employers to exact concessions during contract negotiations.
See generally R. Gorman, Labor Law 211-39 (1976). These forms of picketing are protected to a
certain extent by the National Labor Relations Act §§ 7-8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1976). but
remain subject to constitutional limitations. E.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976),
American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n. 419 U.S. 215 (1974); International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). In several instances, picketing by
empioyees and labor organizations may be regulated by the states, for example: when a valid
state public policy is violated, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430
U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of emotional distress), or when the state's regulation does
not unduly interfere with the scheme of federal labor relations authority. See Amalgamated Ass'n
of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego Bldg
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). A full analysis of picketing in the labor relations
context is beyond the scope of this Note and is discussed only insofar as it is relevant to scapegoat
picketing.
6. Consumer picketing is an exception to federal labor law prohibition of secondary boycotts.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). The
consumer picketing exception, first enunciated in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers &
Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58 (1964), permits peaceful secondary picketing of retail stores directed
solely at appealing to consumers to refrain from buying the primary employer's product. Id. at
63-73. See generally R. Dereshinsky, The NLRB and Secondary Boycotts 5-49 (1972);
R. Gorman, supra note 5, at 257-61.
7. Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145, slip op. at 24.
8. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); CarLon v.
California, 310 U.S. 106, 113 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 508 (1939). The first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law
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picketing may be constitutionally enjoinable.1' For example, recently in Rouse
Philadelphia, Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78,10 members of Ad Hoc '78 picketed the
Gallery shopping mall in Philadelphia to urge others to boycott those stores,
even though the picketers had no economic or other dispute with the Gallery.
The picketers conceded that their activity was an attempt to publicize their
disputes with the government, over which the Gallery had no power or
authority. 1  The Gallery was granted a temporary injunction 12 because the
court deemed both the defendant's purpose and method13 of picketing im-
proper. In an analogous case, Missouri v. National Organization for Women,
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.
9. See Comment, The Consumer Boycott, 42 Miss. L.J. 226, 228-33 (1971); Note, The
Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is There a Safe Way to Picket Under the First
Amendment?, 26 Hastings L.J. 167 (1974). See generally Hersbergen, supra note 1.
10. No. 4145, (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 31, 1979), aff'd, Nos. 380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec.
28, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 99 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1980).
11. "The demonstrators also protested against police brutality, the treatment of the Move
group, the policies of the City government and in opposition to a proposed change in the City
Charter with regard to mayoral succession. They also protested about problems of black
unemployment and problems relating to schools. The plaintiffs have no relationship to any of
these issues whatsoever." Id., slip op. at 23. In testifying as to his group's purpose, the
acknowledged leader of the picketing stated that "[t]he merchants [of the Gallery] wouldn't have
to particularly do anything for me to end the boycott .... [W]e are after the city administration,
the Redevelopment Authority, the Rizzo administration . . . ." Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 6-9, 48-51. There are numerous factors that the court must weigh in determining
whether a preliminary injunction is to be issued. See Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg.
Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 1977); New York Pathological & X-Ray Lab. v. Immigration &
Nat. Serv., 523 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1975); Allison v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1123, 1126 (Sth Cir.
1972). The first factor is that its issuance is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm.
See Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 456 (1973); Lewis v. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1123-24 (Sth Cir.
1976); Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The second requirement Is that
greater injury would result by refusing the injunction, than by granting it. See Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 33
(9th Cir. 1970), affd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See generally
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (1978). Some courts
also require the plaintiff to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, See Brown v.
Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 456 (1973); Walco Prods., Inc. v. Kittay & Blitz, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 121,
124 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Another requirement is that until a final determination is made, the decree
properly restores the parties to the status existing immediately prior to the allegedly wrongful
conduct. See Hollon v. Mathis Ind. School Dist., 491 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Feature Sports, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 966, 967-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The public interest should
also be taken into account. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944). See generally
Farmer & Williamson, Picketing and the Injunctive Power of State Courts-From Thornhill to
Vogt, 35 U. Det. L.J. 431 (1958); Work, Injunctive Relief for Economically-Directed Civil
Rights Picketing, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 516 (1966).
13. See Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942); Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941);
Wortex Mills Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 369 Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851 (1952). The Constitution
does not protect picketing which is "violent, threatening, menacing, insulting, or clearly calcu-
lated to provoke a breach of the peace by others." Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181, 189 (5th Cir.
1969) (citation omitted).
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Inc.,14 a feminist organization sponsored a boycott of any convention in a
state that had not ratified the Equal Rights Amendment.' s This boycott,
however, was held to be neither an antitrust violation 16 nor an unjustified
interference with prospective economic relations.' 7 The court concluded that
the purpose of the boycott and the constitutional interests in protecting the
exercise of the rights of assembly and petition outweighed the state's interest
in protecting a business expectancy.' 8 These cases illustrate the crucial
distinction between protest directed at the primary disputant, which may
incidentally harm unrelated third parties, and scapegoat protests that are
specifically directed at unrelated third parties to symbolize a dispute with the
primary party.
Scapegoat picketing brings into focus a clash between the rights to com-
municate, assemble, and petition,' 9 and the rights to engage in business and
to own and enjoy property. 20 When these rights conflict, 21 the judiciary
14. 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
15. Id. at 291. The National Organization for Women (NOW) organized a boycott to
"persuade and urge those organizations that support [the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)] to
refrain from holding conferences, conventions, and meetings in unratified states." Id. The court
determined that NOW's boycott was both "symbolic" and "to attract attention and bring public
visibility to the issue of ratification [of the ERA]." Id. at 295. The State of Missouri estimated
that the boycott resulted in $19 million in revenue losses. Id. at 297.
16. Id. at 305. The State argued that the boycott violated the Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (1976), and constituted a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976). The court determined, however, that the boycott was essentially political, 467 F. Supp. at
304, and was a legitimate attempt to influence the government, id., thus, falling outside the
proscriptions of the antitrust laws. Id. at 305. There has been a great deal of controversy
regarding the applicability of antitrust laws to non-commercial picketing and boycotts. While
earlier commentators suggested that antitrust laws might be applicable in the political context, see
Coons, Non-Commercial Purposes as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U. L. Rev. 705, 748-SO
(1962); Comment, The Consumer Boycott, 42 Miss. L.J. 226, 238-44 (1971), this argument has
recently been contested. See Sandifer & Smith, The Tort Suit for Damages: The New Threat to
Civil Rights Organizations, 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 559, 573-75 (1975); Note, Political Boycott
Activity and the First Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 659, 678-97 (1978). Furthermore, Eastern
R.tL Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), precludes the
application of the Sherman Act to most non-commercial boycotts. In Noerr, the Court held that
"the Sherman Act does not apply to the [boycott] activities ... at least insofar as those activities
comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement
of laws." Id. at 138. There are numerous exceptions to this doctrine, however, and state
regulation of anticompetitive behavior is not completely preempted by federal law. See generally
L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 238 (1977).
17. 467 F. Supp. at 305-06; see notes 110-18 infra and accompanying text.
18. 467 F. Supp. at 305-06.
19. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S.
106, 113 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 517
(1939). The first amendment guarAntees apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1941) (petition); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
364 (1937) (assembly); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (speech).
20. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327 (1921); Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600,
603, 11 So. 2d 383, 384 (1943); NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 21, 142 S.E.2d 816, 823
(1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 118 (1966) (per curiam); Schmoldt v. Oakley, 390 P.2d 882, 885
(Okla. 1964); cf. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926) ("The right to carry on busi-
ness-be it called liberty or property-has value."); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v.
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endeavors to balance and accommodate them. 22 Although the courts have not
until recently addressed the particular issue, their decisions regarding other
forms of picketing may conclusively end the use of scapegoat picketing as a
form of protest.2 3 First, any picketing that violates a valid public policy or
law may be enjoined. 24 Second, scapegoat picketing may constitute mali-
cious 25 or coercive 26 conduct and thus be subject to enjoinder pursuant to a
tortious injury theory. Finally, a proper balancing of all competing values
may result in a finding that society is benefited when scapegoat picketing is
enjoined. 27 It is submitted, therefore, that scapegoat picketing may be en-
joined without violating constitutional safeguards.
Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 265, 157 N.E. 130, 133 (1927) ("Freedom to conduct a business... is like
a property right.").
21. This conflict has been intensified by the development and use of awesome economic
power by picketers and boycotters. For example, the boycott of table-grapes led by Cesar Chavez
resulted in a reduction in national sales of 12%. Time Magazine, July 4, 1969, at 18. The
retailers of Birmingham, Alabama estimated that they were losing almost $750,000 per week
because of a boycott of stores allegedly engaging in racial discrimination.Time Magazine, June 7,
1963, at 95. See also Hersbergen, supra note 1, at 1147-5 1; Comment, The Consumer Boycott, 42
Miss. L.J. 226, 226-27 (1971).
22. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Carpenters & Joiners Union,
Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 726-27 (1942); Schneider v, State, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939). "[Ihe dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one .... In fact,
a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right
in property. Neither could have meaning without the other." Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). Freedom of speech and press are not absolutes. They do "not mean that
one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses. Rights other than those of the
advocates are involved. By adjustment of rights, we can have both full liberty of expression and
an orderly life." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); accord, NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); see Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 Yale
L. J. 1424 (1962). Yet, some commentators regard the first amendment as absolute. See
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245; Powe, Evolution to
Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 371 (1974).
23. See Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 31, 1979), aff'd, Nos.
380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 99 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1980). See
also Segal v. Wood, 42 A.D.2d 548, 345 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't 1973); Plainview Realty, Inc. v.
Board of Managers of Vill. on Artist Lake Condo., 86 Misc. 2d 515, 383 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct.
1976).
24. See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S. S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 230 (1974); Building Serv.
Employees, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1950); International Bhd, of Teamsters
Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 477-79 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460,
464 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); Carpenters & Joiners
Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725 (1942); Fair Share Org., Inc. v. Mitnick, 134
Ind. App. 675, 678-79, 188 N.E.2d 840, 843-45 (1963); Pappas v. Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 47-48, 116
A.2d 497, 503 (1955); A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 369, 274 N.Y.S. 946, 954
(Sup. Ct. 1934); 1621, Inc. v. Wilson, 402 Pa. 94, 104-05, 106 A.2d 271, 276 (1960); pt. I(B) iytfra.
25. E.g., Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937); see pt. II(A) infra, Compare
Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938)with Schmoldt v.
Oakley, 390 P.2d 882 (Okla. 1964).
26. See notes 80-109 infra and accompanying text. Compare Dicta Realty Assocs. v. Shaw, 50
Misc. 2d 267, 270 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1966) with West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc.
2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
27. See pt. III infra.
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I. PICKETING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Constitutional Guarantees
Freedom of speech, assembly, and petition are fundamental rights pro-
tected by the first amendment against the government's unreasonable abridg-
ment. 28 These liberties are zealously guarded because "Itihe right of an
individual . . . to protest in a peaceable manner against injustice or oppres-
sion, actual or merely fancied, is one to be cherished and not to be proscribed
in any well-ordered society. It is an essential prerogative of free men living
under democratic institutions." 29 Generally, picketing is regarded as a form of
communication protected to a certain extent by this broad interpretation of
the first amendment guarantees. 30
However vital first amendment freedoms are, their existence must be
compatible with the preservation of other essential rights such as the right to
privacy 31 and the right to property. 32 The prohibition on encroachment of
first amendment rights is not an absolute. Restraints are permitted for
various reasons. 33 Accordingly, "pure speech," because of its lofty impor-
tance, may be restrained only upon a showing that a "clear and present
danger" of some substantive evil that the government has,a right to protect
against is likely to result from that speech. 34 Conversely, "symbolic speech"
may be limited only if the restriction is justified by a "sufficiently important
governmental interest. '35 Furthermore, the government is prohibited from
28. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S 51.
56-57 (1973); United States Civ. Serv. Comm. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carners. 413 UtS 548.
567 (1973); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); Gitlow v New York, 268 U S 652. 666
(1925).
29. Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond. 152 Misc. 846.847. 274 N.Y.S 250.251-52 Sup Ct 19341
For further statements concerning the vital importance of free speech and the open dissemination of
ideas, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 270(1964); Bridges v. California. 314 U.S.
252, 263 (1941); Abrams v. United States. 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919) (Holmes. J.. dissentingi
30. See cases cited note 8 supra. See also Tanenhaus. Picketing as Free Speech: Early Stages in
the Growth of the New Law of Picketing, 14 U. Pitt. L. Rev 397 (1953).
31. E.g., Gregory v. Chicago. 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black. J., concurnng, Allen-Bradley
Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.. 315 U.S. 740. 748-49 (1942). Garcia v
Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 544-45 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (19751, Hall v. Hawaiian
Pineapple Co., 72 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D Hawaii 1947); see Griswold v Connecticut. 381 U S, 479.
495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
32. See LinmarkAssocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S.85. q3-94(1977). Hudgensv NLRB.424
U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-68 (19721. See also Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza. Inc., 391 U.S 308. 320 11968). Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1946).
33. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976); e.g., Schenck v United States, 249 U S 47, 52
(1919) (the power of the government to abridge the right to a person to shout 'fire"' fab.ely in a
crowded theatre).
34. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). In each case, the courts determine -whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494. 510 (1951 ); see Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
35. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503. 509 1169) (arm bands),
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968) (burning draftcard); Blanton v. State Univ.. 489
F.2d. 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1973) (student sleep-in); New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F 2d 693, 698
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (hair length); see Note. Symbolic Speech, 43 Fordham
1980]
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regulating the content, subject matter, or message of any speech. 3 6
No longer classified as pure speech, 3 7 picketing is deemed to be "more than
free speech."' 38 Indeed, it is established "that picketing, not being the equiva-
lent of speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent.""9
Recognizing the confrontation and coercion inherent in picketing,40 the Court
L. Rev. 590 (1975). Symbolic speech "has been defined as the communication of opinion by conduct
rather than by the spoken word. Use of symbolic conduct largely has been a result of the participant's
lack of access to the government and the media." Id. at 590 (footnote omitted).
36. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94(1977); Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1962); Termlniello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 365 (1937). "[Glovernment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it
may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. . . . Selective
exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
37. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 555 (1965). Edrly judicial sentiment was hostile to any picketing whatsoever. For example,
in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 F. 582 (S.D. Iowa 1905), the court stated that "[tlhere Is
and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or
peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching. When men want to converse or persuade, they do not
organize a picket line." Id. at 584. Thus, picketing was regarded as either unlawful per se, Sherry v.
Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 214, 17 N.E. 307, 309 (1888), a private nuisance, Hughes v. Kansas City
Motion Picture Mach. Operators, Local 170, 282 Mo. 304, 319, 221 S.W. 95, 99 (1920), an unlawful
conspiracy, Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 62 F. 803, 817-18 (S.D. Ohio 1894), unlawful
intimidation, Kolley v. Robinson, 187 F. 415,416-17 (8th Cir. 1911), or an unjustified tortious injury
to prospective or existing contractual relations. Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118
Mich. 497, 517-18, 77 N.W. 13, 21 (1898). Several New York decisions recognized that picketing, in
and of itself, "connotes no evil." Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 263,
157 N.E. 130, 133 (1927); Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 847, 274 N.Y.S. 250,
251 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Finally, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local 15, 301 U.S. 468
(1937), the Supreme Court indicated for the first time that picketing might be considered within
the protection of the first amendment. Justice Brandeis noted that "[miembers of a [labor] union
might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor
dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 478. Later, in
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Court left no doubt that picketing was protected
expression within the ambit of free speech when it stated that "the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within an area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. 'at 102. This protection has also been extended to nonlabor
picketing. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Hughes v. Superior Ct. of
Cal., 339 U.S. 460 (1950); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938);
United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91
(8th Cir. 1956); Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 A. 109 (1935); People v. Carcel, 3 N.Y.2d
327, 165 N.Y.S.2d 113, 144 N.E.2d 81 (1957); People v. Nahman, 298 N.Y. 95, 81 N.E.2d 36
(1948); Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe, 171 Misc. 279, 12 N. Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1939); 1621,
Inc. v. Wilson, 402 Pa. 94, 166 A.2d 271 (1960).
38. Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
39. Hughes v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 465 (19501; accord, Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969).
40. The picket line "is . . . not so much a rational appeal to persuasion as a signal for the
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began to regard picketing as a variant of "speech-plus. ' 4 1 The Court limited
the protection of picketing because "the very presence of a picket line may
induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the
ideas which are being disseminated." 42 Accordingly, to sustain enjoinder of
picketing, the government must assert that the picketing violates "public
policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its
legislature or its courts. '43 There is no requirement, however, that the
government allege an important, substantial,4 or compelling interest. 45
application of immediate and enormous economic leverage, based on an already prepared position-
As such, it must, under ordinary circumstances, be classified as action rather than expression."
T. Emerson, The System Of Freedom Of Expression 445 (1970). "Patrolling, even peacefully con-
ducted, contains compulsive features since the presence of the picket line, alone, irrespective of the
ideas being communicated, tends to determine responsive behavior." Waldbaum, Inc., v, United
Farm Workers, 87 Misc. 2d 267, 279, 383 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (footnote omitted); see
pt. II(B) infra.
41. The term "speech plus" was first applied to picketing injustice Douglas' concurring opinion
in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 326 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); accord, Building Employees Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950).
It describes activity that combines within the same course of conduct both speech and non-speech
elements. See generally B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law 319 (2d ed. 1979); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 598 (1978).
42. Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl. 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); accord, Building Employees Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537, (1960).
"The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals
by printed word." Hughes v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950), see C. Gregory &
H. Katz, supra note 1, at 307-09; Tanenhaus, supra note 30, at 413-18; Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180 (1942). Furthermore, picketing is confrontation "laden with
emotion, full of suggestions of acute economic conflict and even unspoken possibilities of a violent
physical encounter." Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev
177, 211 (1966). The picket line illustrates one author's observation that "the medium is the
message." M. McLuhan, Understanding Media 7 (1964).
43. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 293 (19561; e.g.,
Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 US. 192 (1953) (state
"right-to-work" law); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (state anti-trade
restraint statute); Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489, 18 N.W.2d 905 (19451 (state anti-trust statute);
Construction & Gen. Labor Union, Local 688 v. Stephenson, 221 S.W.2d 375 tTex. Civ App. 1949)
(state prohibition of secondary picketing in absence of labor dispute); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1977) (trespass); American Radio Ass'n
v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974) (prevention of wrongful interference); Building
Employees Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (prohibition of closed shop);
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (encouragement of
self-employer units); Hughes v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (prohibition of
involuntary employment according to race); Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 213 v- Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (prohibition of secondary picketing); Fair Share Org., Inc. v. Mitnick,
134 Ind. App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963) (equal employment).
44. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
45. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). In
American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974), the respondents challenged the
constitutionality of a state decree enjoining the picketing of a foreign-flag ship in protest over
allegedly substandard wages. This picketing was deemed to violate a state public policy against
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Therefore, although abridgment of pure speech must satisfy the "clear and
present danger" test, and regulation of symbolic speech must serve an
important governmental interest, restriction of picketing is constitutionally
valid if it interferes with a valid governmental interest.
46
B. Confinement of Picketing to a Situs Directly Related to the Dispute:
A Valid State Policy
It is now recognized that government has an interest in controlling picket-
ing "if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose which it
seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance. '47 Furthermore, the
judgment of the government as to whether the picketing interferes with public
policy is weighed with a considerable degree of respect. 4 8 Thus, state policies,
whether enacted by the legislature or recognized by the judiciary, 49 that
prohibit or limit picketing at situses unrelated to the dispute have been upheld
by the courts 0 and support the enjoinder of scapegoat picketing.
As early as 1942, the Supreme Court recognized the validity of a state
policy that restricts picketing to a situs directly related to the dispute. In
wrongful interference by third persons with the conduct of business. Id. at 230. Relying on its
decision in Vogt, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, concluding that Alabama's policy against
"wrongful interference" was within the "broad field in which a State, in enforcing some public policy,
... could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy."
Id. at 230 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court's determination rested not on a compelling or
important state interest, but on a valid state public policy. Id. at 231. For cases requiring a
compelling state interest to justify restriction on fundamental rights, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
46. E.g., American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974); International Bid. of
Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Hughes v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S.
460 (1950). But see National Treas. Employees Union v. Fasser, 428 F. Supp. 295 (D.D.C. 1976), in
which the court stated "[w]hen speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same act,
Government regulation is permitted where the following (onditions are met: (1) the regulation
furthers an important government interest, (2) the Government interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression, and (3) the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is 'no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.' "Id. at 298. TheFasser court apparently confused the
test for abridgment of picketing with the test for abridgment of "symbolic speech" as evidenced by its
reliance on "symbolic speech" cases. Id. The court inRouse accurately described the hierarchy of first
amendment protection of communication: "as a person's activities move away from pure speech and
into the area of expressive conduct they require less constitutional protection. As the mode of
expression moves from the printed page or from pure speech to the commission of public acts, the
scope of permissible regulation of such expression increases." Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, Nos.
380, 390, 444, slip op. at 7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1979) (emphasis in original).
47. Hughes v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 465-66 (1950).
48. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951); International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). Because a state's judgment embraces "social and economic
policies, which in turn depend on knowledge and appraisal of local social and economic factors, such
judgment on these matters comes to this Court bearing a weighty title of respect." Id. at 475.
49. Hughes v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 466 (1950).
50. See, e.g., Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Pipe
Mach. Co. v. DeMore. 36 Ohio Op. 342, 76 N.E.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1947); Evening Times
Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 124 N.J. Eq. 71, 199 A. 598 (1938).
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Carpenters & Joiners Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe,-' a builder used non-union
employees to construct a building for Ritter, causing members of a union to
picket at Ritter's restaurant located one and a half miles from the site of the
construction. In addition, the restaurant union engaged in a sympathy strike
and union truck drivers refused to cross the picket lines to make deliveries to
Ritter's restaurant.5 2 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals enjoined the picket-
ing, finding that it constituted a violation of state antitrust laws.- 3 On appeal,
acknowledging the necessity to insulate uninvolved parties from industrial
conflict, the Supreme Court held that the states must have the power "to
confine the sphere of communication to that directly related to the dispute."5 4
Thus, it was constitutionally valid for Texas to protect the general welfare by
prohibiting the exertion of concerted pressures aimed at a business "wholly
outside the economic context of the real dispute.""5
The enjoinder of picketing at a situs that is unrelated to the particular
grievance or dispute has also been held to be justified by a valid public policy
in the context of residential picketing.5 6 Recently, in DeGregory v. Giesing, "
a federal district court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute prohibit-
ing the picketing of homes or residences. The court noted that the statutory
classification which was based on location, not subject matter,5 '1 was similar
51. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
52. Id. at 722-24.
53. Id. at 724.
54. Id. at 727-28. It is "It]he right of the state to determine whether the common interest is best
served by imposing some restrictions upon the use of weapons for inflicting economic injury in the
struggle of conflicting industrial forces ... I" d. at 725. See also Senn v Tile Layers Protective
Union, 301 U.S. 468, 481 (1937); Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306. 311 1926). Truax v Corrigan. 257
U.S. 312, 363 (1921) (Brandeis, J.. dissenting); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194. 205 11904)
55. 315 U.S. at 726. Such prohibitions are analogous to federal prohibition of secondary boycotlts
in labor disputes. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8tb)(4). 29 U S C_ § 158(bit4i
(1976). "The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who
alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it-" International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB. 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950), cert denied, 341 U S
694 (1951); see R. Dereshinsky, supra note 6, at 5-49; R. Gorman. supra note 5, at 251-54
56. See notes 131-43 infra and accompanying text. In Pipe Mach Co. v DeMore, 36 Ohio
Op. 342, 76 N.E.2d 725 (Ct. App. 19471. for example, a union began to picket the
residences of employees who had crossed a union picket line to denounce those employees as
"scabs." In affirming an order enjoining the picketing in the vicinity of private residences. the
court reasoned that "[i]f there is to be, . . . 'restriction of picketing to the area within which a
. .dispute arises' any picketing of residences in a labor dispute should be enjoined" Id at 344.
76 N.E.2d at 727. It is important to note that "Ithe fact that [thel policy is expressed by the
judicial organ of the State rather than by the legislature (is] immaterial " Hughes v Superior Ct_
of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 466 (1950).
57. 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977).
58. Id. at 915. Similarly, in Police Dep't of Chicago v Mosley, 408 U S 92 119723. the Court
considered whether exemption of peaceful labor picketing from its general prohibition on
picketing next to a public school is permissible. The Court decided it was not, because the
ordinance at issue described peaceful picketing in terms of its subject matter Id at 94-95 An)
discrimination in the content of picketing must serve a substantial government interest- Id at 99.
An abridgment of scapegoat picketing would not be based on a distinction between content of
picketers' messages, since such an abridgment is based on location; the content of the
message is irrelevant. See Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78. No. 4145 tC.P. Phila- Co. Jan. 31,
19801
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to traditionally permissible time, place and manner restrictions on public
communication. 59 Furthermore, proscription of picketing, demonstrating, and
parading in residential areas 60 is consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated
assertion that "people who want to propagandize protests or views [do not]
have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they
please." '6' The regulation of scapegoat picketing would also be legitimate as a
valid area-based restriction of first amendment rights because the scapegoat
picketers would not be precluded from communicating their messages in a
more appropriate locale.
Regulations on the location of picketing are valid if they do not distinguish
between permissible and impermissible picketing on the basis of the content of
the message that the picketers are attempting to convey. 62 For example, a
state cannot permit labor picketing in a designated area, if it prohibits
political or consumer picketing in that area. 63 It might be argued that a
restriction of scapegoat picketing is similarly a content based distinction,
because it is premised on the absence of a dispute between the picketers and
their target. Upon closer examination, however, the basis of a restriction on
1979), aff'd, Nos. 380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 99 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 25, 1980); City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 412-14, 182 N.W.2d 530, 537-38
(1971).
59. 427 F. Supp. at 915. The permissibility of picketing in residential areas is governed by
certain special circumstances. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
For example, when there is no showing that sidewalks in residential areas have been made a
public forum by the state for the purpose of "assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions," id. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)), the state may properly restrict the picketing in that area.
Persons in their homes cannot avoid pickets on their sidewalks. Thus, the "very basic right to be
free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter [they] do not want," must be protected. Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); accord, Hynes v. Mayor & Council of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1976).
60. The courts have upheld the prohibition of picketing in certain other designated areas in
order to promote the public peace. See United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962) (area
contiguous to submarine); Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 640 (1939) (embassy); Scott v. District of Columbia, 184 A.2d 849 (Ct. App. D.C. 1962)
(White House gate). In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court upheld a Louisiana
location-based statute, stating that "[i]t prohibits a particular type of conduct, namely, picketing
and parading, in a few specified locations, in or near courthouses." Id. at 562. In Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), although not a picketing case, the Court upheld the trespass
convictions of petitioners who claimed they were exercising their first amendment rights by
parading near a jail. The Court noted that "there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that
they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objections,
because this 'area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only "reasonable" but
also particularly appropriate.' " Id. at 47-48; accord, Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617
(1968) (upholding prohibition of picketing at a courthouse).
61. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966); see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555-64
(1965).
62. E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119-20 (1972); Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70
(1964).
63. E.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92. 94-98 (1972).
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scapegoat picketing would be the unrelatedness of the situs to the dispute;"
the political or philosophical message itself is irrelevant. Furthermore, even if
the restriction on scapegoat picketing is considered to be based on the content
of the picketers' message, it is nevertheless valid if enjoinder furthers a
substantial state interest, 65 such as the limitation of picketing to the situs of
that dispute. 6
6
In sum, it is evident that a prohibition of scapegoat picketing would
effectuate the government's interests in the preservation of the economy
against the disruption of businesses that are unrelated to the picketers'
disputes, 67 and in the elimination of conduct that "unlawfully prejudices the
rights and privileges of those [not disputants]. '68 Thus, it is within the public
policy of a state to confine picketing exclusively to those situses with which
the picketers' dispute is directly related.
II. SCAPEGOAT PICKETING: MALICIOUS, COERCIVE, OR
INTENTIONALLY TORTIOUS?
Picketing and other first amendment activity that is maliciously moti-
vated, 69 or coercive, 70 or intentionally interferes with prospective contractual
relations7' may justifiably be enjoined. Such conduct is deemed to violate
valid public policy.72
A. Malicious Picketing
Numerous courts have held that picketing and other first amendment
expression conducted for the sole purpose of inflicting injury on another, has a
64. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972); Garcia v Gray, 507 F 2d 539, 544
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975); City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis- 2d 398,
407-08, 182 N.W.2d 530, 535 (1971).
65. E.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972); DeGregory v Giesing,
427 F. Supp. 910, 914 (D. Conn. 1977).
66. See id. at 915; cf. Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U S 722.
727 (1942) (sphere of communication should be confined "to that directly related to the dispute");
Gomez v. United Office & Professional Workers, Local 16, 73 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D.D.C. 1947)
(picketing should be restricted "to a point within a reasonable radius of the area" of the labor
dispute).
67. See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215. 231 (1974).
68. Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild. 124 N J. Eq.
71, 83, 199 A. 598, 605 (1938); see State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 481-82, 265 N.W. 302, 302
(1936); Springfield, Bayside Corp. v. Hochman, 44 Misc. 2d 882, 886, 255 N.Y.S.2d 140, 145.46
(Sup. Ct. 1964); Hebrew Home & Hosp. for Chronic Sick, Inc. v. Davis, 38 Misc. 2d 173, 177-78,
235 N.Y.S.2d 318, 323-24 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
69. See, e.g., NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965), cert. dismissed, 384
U.S. 118 (1966) (per curiam); Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937), Saxon
Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
70. See, e.g., Roosevelt Hosp. v. Orlansky, 92 Misc. 2d 525, 400 N.Y.S 2d 663 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Springfield, Bayside Corp. v. Hochman, 44 Misc. 2d 882, 255 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct.
1964); West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
71. See, e.g., NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 21, 142 S.E.2d 816, 823 (1965), cert.
dismissed, 384 U.S. 118 (1966) (per curiam).
72. See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.& 215. 230-31 (1974); Hughes v
Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1950).
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malicious purpose and therefore, is enjoinable. 73 In Menard v. Houle, 74 for
example, the defendant, an automobile purchaser dissatisfied with the dealer's
refusal to replace an allegedly defective steering system, tied lemons to the car
and covered it with disparaging writing directed at the dealer. 75 The defen-
dant then parked the car near the dealership. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's issuance of an injunction, stating that
conduct is enjoinable "where there is a continuing course of unjustified and
wrongful attack upon the plaintiff."'76 Similarly, in Saxon Motor Sales, Inc.
v. Torino, 77 a New York Supreme Court determined that if the evidence
demonstrates that the defendant's sole purpose is to injure the plaintiff, it is
sufficient to support an injunction of the defendant's demonstration. 78 These
cases are based on the rationale that although articulate consumer protests
should be permitted, "[a]cts . . . tending to injure the plaintiffs' business are
not in the realm of the permissible. '79
It would appear that scapegoat picketing which causes others to refrain
from or to discontinue business relationships with the target, is conducted
solely to injure and destroy the target for symbolic purposes. 80 Although the
necessity for public communication is great, the arbitrary selection of an
innocent party as the focus of the picketers' activity, rather than the exertion
of pressure against those who could more effectively deal with their protests,
offends the norms of civil responsibility. 81 Therefore, scapegoat picketing is
arguably motivated by a malicious purpose and is constitutionally enjoinable.
B. Coercive Picketing
The courts have also enjoined picketing that has a coercive effect on the
target.8 2 Although the meaning of "coercion" in this context is clouded, the
picketing of a target unrelated to the dispute may be coercive and enjoinable
73. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921),
NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 22-24, 142 S.E.2d 816, 822-24 (1965), cert. dismissed, 384
U.S. 118 (1966) (per curiam); Hornsby v. Smith, 141 Ga. 491, 497-98, 13 S.E.2d 20, 23-24 (1941).
74. 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937).
75. Id. at 547, 11 N.E.2d at 436-37. The writing stated: " 'Don't believe what they say, this
car is no good; I tried to have it fixed but they can't fix it and they will do nothing about it .
this car was no good when I got it; don't be a sucker, this car is no good but it looks all right.'
Id., 11 N.E.2d at 437.
76. Id. at 548, 11 N.E.2d at 437.
77. 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938). In Saxon, the defendant placed large
signs disparaging the quality of the automobile on the sides and rear of the vehicle. The defendant
then parked the car in close proximity to the plaintiff dealer's place of business. Id. at 863, 2
N.Y.S.2d at 885.
78. Id. at 863-64, 2 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86.
79. Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 847. 274 N.Y.S. 250, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
80. See notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text.
81. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152-54 (1969); Hughes v
Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 464-66 (1950); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
See generally T. Emerson, The Right To Protest, in The Rights of Americans 208 (N. Dorsen ed.
1971).
82. E.g., Streamwood Home Builders, Inc. v. Brolin, 25 I1. App. 2d 39, 46-48, 165 N.E.2d
531, 535-36 (1960); Springfield, Bayside Corp. v. Hocbman, 44 Misc. 2d 882, 885-86, 255
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despite first amendment considerations. In Organization For A Better Austin
v. Keefe, 8 3 the Supreme Court discussed the relationship between coercive
activity and first amendment freedoms. In that case, a community group
distributed throughout the neighborhood of a local real estate agent leaflets
accusing him of racially discriminatory "blockbusting."84 In reversing and
vacating the injunctive decree of a state court, the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he claim that the [pamphleteering was] intended to exercise a coercive
impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First
Amendment. [The pamphleteers] plainly intended to influence respondents's
conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the
function of a newspaper." s Thus, under a broad reading of Keefe, it may be
argued that any coercive picketing should be protected by the first amend-
ment.
8 6
Prior decisions of the Supreme Court, however, indicate that there is a
distinction between coercion that is effectuated by force of public sentiment,
and coercion resulting from malicious injury or intimidation.8 7 In Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union,8 8 for example, the Supreme Court stated that
picketing is within the protection of the first amendment when "[t]he sole
purpose of the picketing was to acquaint the public with the facts and ... to
induce [the target] to unionize his shop." 89 In such a case, there is no coercion
but only "persuasion incident to publicity." 90 Thus, Senn implies that picket-
ing is coercive when it does not merely publicize a group's views or protests,
but intentionally damages or destroys the property rights of others. 9' This
interpretation is bolstered by the Court's statement in Cafeteria Employees
N.Y.S.2d 140, 145-46 (Sup. Ct. 1964); West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor. 23 Misc 2d 867,
869-71, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199-200 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
83. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
84. Id. at 416. "Blockbusting" or "panic peddling" involves a realtor who arouses fears of
white residents by asserting that blacks are moving into their neighborhood, and exploits these
racial fears by obtaining listings of houses which he can then sell to blacks Id.
85. Id. at 419.
86. "Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in making the public aware of respon-
dent's real estate practices. Those practices were offensive to them, as the views and practices of
petitioners are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the means are peaceful, the
communication need not meet standards of acceptability .... No prior deciions support the
claim that the interest of an individual in being free from public criticism of his business practices
in pamphlets or leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court." ld at 419 This
analysis, however, dealt only with pamphleteering and thus, may not be directly applicable to
picketing. This suggestion is buttressed by the fact that the Court specifically noted that there
"was no evidence of picketing." Id. at 417; see Walinsky v. Kennedy. 94 Misc. 2d 121, 132, 404
N.Y.S.2d 491, 498 (Sup. Ct. 1977); cf. Hersbergen, supra note 2. at 1118-31 tuncertain effect of
Keefe).
87. See Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe. 402 U.S 415 (1971). Moore v. Newell,
548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 971 (1977
88. 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
89. Id. at 480.
90. Id. at 481.
91. Id. at 480; see Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145, slip op. at 27 (C. P. Phila. Co.
Jan. 31, 1979), aff'd, Nos, 380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 99
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1980).
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Local 302 v. Angelos, 92 that "acts of coercion going beyond the mere influence
exerted by the fact of picketing, are of course, not constitutional preroga-
tives." 9
3
It becomes apparent, therefore, that in the context of organized protests,
the Court has distinguished between two types of coercive expressions.
Coercion that is merely "incident to publicity" will be protected; 94 coercion
that attempts to intimidate the target by intentionally causing economic harm
goes beyond normal persuasion and will not be protected. 95 For example, in
the recent case Moore v. Newell, 96 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the extortion
conviction of a representative of the Black Panthers who, upon being refused
a charitable contribution by a merchant, began picketing the merchant's
store. 97 Although noting that picketing may be protected first amendment
activity if it incidentally discourages customers from patronizing a store or
business, 98 the court classified the defendant's picketing as coercive because it
was intimidating, 9" and thus, beyond the pale of constitutional protection.
Once the two forms of coercive picketing are distinguished, the remaining
issue is to determine the particular factual circumstances that will render
coercive picketing enjoinable. It appears that the lack of a grievance or
contractual relationship between picketers and their target causes picketing to
exceed normal persuasion and constitute unlawful duress and coercion. 100 For
example, in Streamwood Home Builders, Inc. v. Brolin, 101 homeowners in a
housing development picketed the plaintiff developer's office, demanding that
more schools be built in the area. 102 The court enjoined the picketing because
the plaintiff had no legal obligation to build schools. 10 3 Thus, the picketing
could not be justified as a lawful expression of community interest, but as an
attempt to alter government policy by intimidating a totally unrelated indi-
vidual.
Similarly, picketing a corporation with which the picketers have no griev-
ance is deemed coercive. In West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 104 for
92. 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
93. Id. at 295.
94. See, e.g., Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Senn v.
Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1937).
95. See, e.g., Moore v. Newell, 548 F.2d 671, 673 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 971
(1977); Roosevelt Hosp. v. Orlansky, 92 Misc. 2d 525, 526-27, 400 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664-65 (Sup.
Ct. 1977); West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 869-70, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196,
198-99 (Sup. Ct. 1960). These cases comport with Professor Gregory's definition of coercion as
"'pressure'-the creation of a situation which will cause the picketed person serious economic
harm if he does not comply with the picketers' demands." Gregory, Picketing and Coercion: A
Defense, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1053, 1058 (1953).
96. 548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 971 (1977).
97. Id. at 672.
98. Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940)).
99. 548 F.2d at 673.
100. Compare Dicta Realty Assocs. v. Shaw, 50 Misc. 2d 267, 270 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct.
1966) with West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
101. 24 Ill. App. 2d 39, 165 N.E.2d 531 (1960).
102. Id. at 41, 165 N.E.2d at 532.
103. Id. at 42, 48, 165 N.E.2d at 533, 536.
104. 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Iq60).
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example, the defendant, a dissatisfied home purchaser, picketed the plaintiff's
housing development even though he had bought his home from an entirely
different corporation.10 5 The only connection between the defendant's dispute
and the target of the picketing was that both corporations shared a common
major shareholder. 10 6 The court enjoined the picketing, interpreting it as a
malicious effort to intimidate and coerce the plaintiff for the purpose of
forcing the settlement of an unrelated dispute.10 7 The court noted that "the
course of conduct of the defendant is directed against third persons . . . and
not against the corporation which allegedly sold a home to defendant and
against which defendant has an alleged claim for defects in construction and
misrepresentations." 10 8 Thus, picketing a target that owes no contractual duty
to the picketer, and picketing a target with which the picketer has no dispute,
are both coercive conduct, and wrongful to such an extent that such first
amendment expression may be restrained. 10 9 Under this analysis, scapegoat
picketing which necessarily entails a lack of a dispute between the protest and
the target, is conducted to exert malicious coercion and may be enjoined by
the courts.
C. Tortious Interference
The theory of tortious intentional interference with prospective economic
relations has also justified enjoinder of picketing and supported liability for
damages. 110 Thus, even if the ultimate motive for the picketing is to alter or
105. Id. at 868, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 869-71, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200.
108. Id. at 870, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
109. The importance of the existence of a dispute in determining the constitutionality of
enjoining picketing is further illustrated by Dicta Realty Assocs. v. Shaw, 50 Misc. 2d 267, 270
N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1966), in which a tenant picketed his apartment complex, complaining of
poor maintenance. The court refused to enjoin the picketing, because it was directed primarily at
the party with which he had the dispute. Id. at 270-71, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46. Similarly, in
Schmoldt v. Oakley, 390 P.2d 882 (Okla. 1964), and McMorries v Hudson Sales Corp.. 233
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), the courts did not enjoin picketing directed against the party
with whom the protest was concerned. In Schynoldt, the defendant, a disgruntled automobile
purchaser, upon rejection of his claim by plaintiff-dealer, placed upon his vehicle a seven by two
and one-half foot sign, covered with writing disparaging the dealer. Upon the sign, the defendant
suspended lemons. He then drove the vehicle in the vicinity of the dealership and parked it there,
390 P.2d at 883. The court refused to enjoin the acts of the defendant. Id. at 886-87. In
McMorries, the defendant placed signs on his automobile which disparaged the plaintiff. He
subsequently drove the vehicle in the proximity of Hudson dealerships in principal cities and
towns in Texas. 233 S.W.2d at 939. The plaintiff was the wholesale distributor of Hudson autos
in Texas, and a representative of the company with which the defendant had his dispute.
Id. at 938-39. There was, then, a dispute nexus in this case. The way in which the court
distinguished Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937), is also significant. While
noting the factual similarity of the cases, 233 S.W.2d at 941, the court noted that in Menard, the
defendant's claims were knowingly false and therefore, no dispute existed between the picketer
and his target. Id. The only way in which the above cases can be reconciled is to recognize that
the lack of a dispute between the picketers and their target demonstrates the picketers' coercive
intent and subjects the picketing to enjoinder.
110. See, e.g., American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U S 215, 230-31 (1974),
Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145, slip op. at 31-33 (C.P. Phila Co. Jan 31. 1979),
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influence government policy, III if it "causes other damages while acting under
the guise of attempting to persuade the government [liability will be] im-
posed."' 12 Under this theory, the actor must have "the purpose of causing this
specific type of harm to the plaintiff."''113 Second, the harm must actually
result. 114 Finally, the court must determine whether the alleged interference is
aff'd, Nos. 380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 99 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
25, 1980). For example, in NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965), cert.
dismissed, 384 U.S. 118 (1966) (per curiam), the plaintiff store-owner was picketed and boycotted
by the NAACP for allegedly beating a black youth whom he had discharged because of alleged
theft. Id. at 19, 142 S.E.2d at 825. In reversing an award of damages against the Georgia
State Conference of the NAACP, but affirming it as to all other defendants, the court noted that
the right to operate a business is to be protected and that defendants' activities, being malicious,
were actionable. Id. at 21, 142 S.E.2d at 824. It is important to recognize that the court
specifically noted that there were no allegations of racial discrimination, Id. at 22, 142
S.E.2d at 823, hence it can be inferred that the court based liability upon the fact that there was
no dispute between the picketers and the target. Similarly, in Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, Inc. v. A.G. Corp., 241 S.E.2d 619 (Miss. 1970), in response to an alleged beating of
blacks by police officers, the defendants organized a boycott of all white businesses, including the
plaintiff's. Id. at 621-23. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in affirming liability for maliciously
conspiring to injure the plaintiff's business, stated that "[tihe whole trouble in this case was that
these defendants had no complaint or grievance or even a gripe against the [picketed target]." Id.
at 624. The court noted that the right to boycott in protest of racially discriminatory treatment
may be protected by the first amendment, but that no such allegations were made to the plaintiff
in this case. Id. at 624; see New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938);
Note, Prior Restraint of Racial Picketing, 17 U. Fla. L. Rev. 453 (1964).
111. See Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289, 305 (W.D. Mo.
1979); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1972). It can be argued that certain
conduct in furtherance of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances is
privileged and not actionable in tort. In Sierra Club, for example, a lumber company coun-
terclaimed for tort damages because the Sierra Club, by oral and written representations,
assertions of administrative appeals, and filing of complaints, had sought to persuade the
government to preserve forests as a natural resource and not to permit their use for manufactur-
ing lumber. Id. at 935-36. The court rejected the counterclaim, noting that "when a suit
based on interference with an advantageous relationship is brought against a party whose
'interference' consisted of petitioning a governmental body to alter its previous policy a privilege
is created by the guarantee of the First Amendment." Id. at 938.
112. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 939 (N.D Cal. 1972). The imposition of tort
damages upon civil rights organizations has been criticized. See Sandifer & Smith, supra note 16
at 559; Note, The Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is There A Safe Way to Picket Under
the First Amendment?, 26 Hastings L.J. 167 (1974); Note, Mississippi's Secondary Boycott
Statutes: Unconstitutional Deprivations of the Right to Engage in Peaceful Picketing and
Boycotting, 18 How. L J. 583 (1975).
113. BirI v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 402 Pa. 297, 301, 167 A.2d 472, 474 (1960); e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1977). "One who intentionally and improperly interferes
with another's prospective contractual relation . . . is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference
consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the
prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective
relation." Id.
114. E.g., Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 402 Pa. 297, 301, 167 A.2d 472, 474 (1960); see
Bruce Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 325 F.2d 2, 14 (3d Cir. 1963)
(requiring a "reasonable assurance" that prospective economic benefit would have been achieved).
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"improper," ' I s in the sense that it was "both injurious and transgressive of
generally accepted standards of common morality or of law.""
6
It is submitted that when all these factors are considered, scapegoat
picketing would be found improper and therefore, enjoinable and actionable
in tort. First, the scapegoat picketer's motive is to interfere intentionally
with the target's prospective economic relations.' Moreover, the social inter-
ests advanced by the scapegoat picketers-to injure and destroy the economic
well-being of the target, merely as a form of symbolic protest against some
unrelated third party-do not justify the interference with economic and
contractual relationships. "18
III. SCAPEGOAT PICKETING AND THE BALANCING PROCESS
In the absence of a statute or a clearly articulated public policy, some courts
have utilized a balancing test to determine the validity of restrictions on
picketing. 1 9 In all picketing cases, the individual's freedom of expression is
115. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767, Comment c, at 31 (1977). See also Adler,
Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 431, 393 A.2d 1175, 1183 (1978).
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2817 (1979).
116. Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem. Park, 43 N.J. Super 244, 255, 128 A.2d 281, 287
(App. Div. 1957). See also In Re Kearney Chems., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1107. 1112 tD. Del. 1979); 1
F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 6.11, at 510 (1956); Carpenter, Interference With
Contract Relations, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 745 (1927-1928).
117. E.g., Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145, (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan 31, 1979), aff'd,
Nos. 380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28 1979), appeal docketed, No. 99 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25,
1980). The picketing in Rouse caused an estimated loss of $225,000 in sales revenue in five days
to Gimbels Inc., one of the ninety-four businesses leasing space in the Gallery. Other stores in the
Gallery suffered losses up to 74% in sales revenue. Id. at 88-89.
118. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1977). The Restatement lists the following
factors to determine whether conduct interfering with contractual or economic relations should be
privileged: "(a) the nature of the actor's conduct, (b) the actor's motive, (c) the interests of the
other with which the actor's conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the
actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual
interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference,
and (g) the relations between the parties." Id. The more directly the actor's conduct causes the
interference, the greater that factor will be weighed against him. Id. § 767, Comment h.
119. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.. 354 U S. 284 (1957).
"[Tlhe [courts'] strong reliance on the particular facts in each [picketing] case demonstrated a
growing awareness that these cases involved not so much questions of free speech as review of the
balance ...between picketing that involved more than 'publicity' and competing interests of
state policy." Id. at 290. "Thus, when there develops a dispute or controversy between conflicting
claims to certain rights and freedoms, it is the function of the Court to attempt to so balance and
distribute these rights as between the contending parties as to do the greatest good for the greatest
number of people." Clemmons v. Congress of Racial Equality, 201 F. Supp. 737, 748 (E.D. La.
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 L'.S. 992 (1964).
Picketing will certainly cause some damage to the picketed target, and "if it is to be permitted by
the courts, [it] requires justification in a balancing of advantages and disadvantages to the
interests of all . . . parties." A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 366, 274 N.Y.S.
946, 950 (Sup. Ct. 1934). See generally Emerson, supra note 22; Frantz. supra note 22. Mendelson,
On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance. 50 Calif. L. Rev. 821 (1962).
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the most significant factor in opposition to enjoinder. 120 However, such rights
"must be accommodated with.. . property rights with as little destruction of
one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other. . . . The locus of that
accommodation may fall at different points along the spectrum depending on
the nature and strength of the rights asserted in a particular context."' 2'
There are several important considerations to be weighed in determining
whether protesters have "the right to conduct picketing on or in direct relation
to private property. '122 One is whether the conduct assertedly protected by
the first amendment is "directly related in its purpose" to the use of the
subject property. 123 Another consideration is whether there exist reasonable
alternative means of communication to reach the intended audience. 124 It is
submitted that application of these factors to scapegoat picketing will result in
a finding that compels enjoinder.
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 125 the Supreme Court balanced these consid-
120. See, e.g., American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1974);
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Hughes v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339
U.S. 460, 464 (1950); Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local ?13 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722,
725-26 (1942); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940).
121. Advance Indus. Div.-Overhead Door Corp. v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 1976)
(citation omitted).
122. Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975).
123. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563 (1972); Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 543
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975); see City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d
398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971).
124. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566 (1972).
125. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Lloyd was the second of a trilogy of cases involving protests at
shopping centers. In Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968), the Court held that a union has a first amendment right to picket a primary
employer in a large private shopping center complex. Id. at 319. Thus, the Court expanded the
"public function" doctrine first applied in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) to a
"company town." "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of
the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets
and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied." Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 494, 515-16 (1939). The Logan
Valley Court concluded that since the shopping center was the "functional equivalent" of the
business district in Marsh, the center should be treated like public property. 391 U.S. at 325.
Thus, the private property owner in Logan Valley could not limit first amendment rights by
prohibiting picketing of a primary employer although it was located in a large shopping center.
Id. at 319-20. The union's picketing was consonant with the use to which the property was being
put, because the picketing was directed at the manner in which the targeted store was operated
and the union directed its message only to the patrons of the store. Id. at 321-22. The Court in
Logan Valley, however, specifically reserved the issue of whether a first amendment right exists if
the purpose of picketing is not directly related to the use to which the picketed property is
actually put. Id. at 320 n.9. The final case of the trilogy was Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976), in which picketers supporting an economic strike filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB after they were threatened with arrest if picketing did not cease. The Court held that a
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erations to determine whether a privately owned shopping center may pro-
hibit the distribution of handbills protesting the Vietnam War when the
handbilling is unrelated to the shopping center's operations) t 26 A closely
divided Court held that a private property owner may limit the exercise of
free speech that is unrelated to the use of his property when alternative means
are available to communicate the dispute to the intended audience. 12 7 Al-
though it is uncertain whether both prongs of this test must be satisfied, 12
8 it
is arguable that scapegoat picketing satisfies neither test. Because the dispute
is not related to the private property at which the protest is directed, the
purpose of the picketing is not related to the use of that property.1
2 9
Furthermore, because the picketing is totally unrelated to the situs, there are
innumerable alternative means of communication available to the protest-
ers. 130 Thus, scapegoat picketers have no protected first amendment right to
picket on or in direct relation to property unrelated to their dispute.
union has no first amendment right to picket at a shopping center and that such protection should
be controlled by labor legislation. Id. at 523. Thus, the status of non-labor shopping center
picketing must be determined in light of Lloyd and Logan Valley. A majority of the Supreme
Court believed that Lloyd distinguished, rather than overruled, Logan Vallk. Id. at 523
(Powell, J. concurring) (Burger, C. J., joins); id. at 524 (White, J.. concurring), id. at 535
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (Brennan, J., joins). See generally Note, Shopping Center P:ckl:ing:
The Impact of Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 45 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 812 (1977)
126. 407 U.S. at 552.
127. Id. at 563. The Court concluded that the respondents had failed to meet this test because
their anti-war message was not related to the use to which the property was being put, and since
the intended audience was the public at large, the protestors had alternative means of communi-
cation available to them. Id. at 564.
128. The picketing that was protected by the Court in Logan Valley satisfied both tests, 391
U.S. at 321, while the expression left unprotected, in Lloyd satisfied neither. 407 U.S. at 563-64-
129. See Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). "[Nb
. . . First Amendment protection is afforded to defendants where their activities are directed
toward those plaintiffs with no interest in the premises ... " Segal v. Wood, 42 AD.2d 548, 549,
345 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (1st Dep't 1973). Although perhaps overstating the necessity for a
relationship between the picketers and the target, in People v. Sinclair, 86 Misc. 426, 149 N.YS.
54 (1914), aff'd, 167 A.D. 899, 151 N.Y.S. 1136 (1st Dep't 1915), the court stated that "peaceful
picketing is allowed because those who picket have a special interest as distinguished from that of
the public in doing what they do for the welfare of those in the occupation to which such pickets
belong. They are not allowed to picket because as members of the public they have a grievance,
but because they have a special right or interest to protect." Id. at 438, 149 N.Y.S. at 61.
Similarly, in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S 552 (1938). the Court stated
that "those having a direct or indirect interest in such terms and conditions of employment should
be at liberty to advertise and disseminate facts and information." Id. at 563- Thus, some sort of
interest is required. There is no such interest in the scapegoat picketing context. In City of
Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971), the court sustained the validity of
a state anti-residential picketing statute. The ordinance in Wauwatosa exempted residential
picketing at employment sites and therefore was challenged as a denial of equal protection. The
court rejected this challenge noting that "it is the relatedness of the dispute to the fact of use of
the home as a place of employment that is controlling." Id. at 412, 182 N.W.2d at 538.
But see State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 316, 372 A.2d 1076, 1082 (1q77)
130. See Note, Shopping Center Picketing: The Impact of Hudgens v National Labor
Relations Board, 45 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 812, 817 n.37 (1977).
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In residential picketing cases courts have also upheld the enjoinder of
picketing,' 3 ' basing their decisions not only upon state policies of confining
the sphere of communication to that directly related to the dispute, but also
upon a balancing of the right to picket and the right to privacy., 32 The
majority of cases that have addressed this conflict have protected privacy, not
picketing.' 33 The rationale is that a ban on residential picketing protests the
public peace13 4 and the sanctity of the home.1 35 Indicative of this balancing
process is the recent New York case of Walinsky v. Kennedy, 136 in which an
association of homosexuals picketed the residence of the plaintiff in response
to an editorial he had authored opposing the enactment of a "gay-rights" bill.
Stating that the request for an injunction "involves a balancing of competing
social interests,"' 37 the court held that plaintiffs right to privacy when
considered against the defendants' choice of a residential situs rather than a
more appropriate business office, tipped the balance in favor of enjoinder. 138
Although the balancing of competing rights generally has resulted in a
determination that the privacy of the individual homeowner was entitled to
protection, a contrary result has been reached under the particular circum-
stances of some cases. Thus, the picketing of the private home of a state
governor has been held a proper exercise of the right of assembly and
petition, 39 as has the peaceful picketing of the residence of the head of a
United States agency. 140 The residential picketing of an otherwise inaccessible
landlord has also been upheld.141 In those cases in which the right to picket
overcame the right to privacy, special circumstances existed. The first cate-
gory is the picketing of public persons or government officials who certainly
131. See Kamin, supra note 42; Note, Picketers at the Doorstep, 9 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
95 (1974); Note, Picketing the Homes of Public Officials, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 106 (1966); 7 U.
Bait. L. Rev. 107 (1977).
132. See, e.g., Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94 Misc. 2d 121, 127-29, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491, 495-96
(Sup. Ct. 1977); Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1482 (1970); Fried,
Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 755 (1963); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev.
1.
133. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971
(1975); State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939); State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 265
N.W. 302 (1936); Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94 Misc. 2d 121, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971).
134. See State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 311 (1930); Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94
Misc. 2d 121, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1977); People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Magis. Ct.
1941).
135. Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975);
State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 336, 285 N.W. 903, 905 (1939); State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481,
482, 265 N.W. 302, 302, (1936); Pipe Mach. Co. v. DeMore, 36 Ohio Op. 342, 344, 76 N.E.2d
725, 727 (Ohio App. 1947).
136. 94 Misc. 2d 121, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
137. Id. at 125, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
138. Id. at 131-32, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
139. Flores v. City of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1950).
140. State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. 372, 274 A.2-1 897 (1971).
141. Hibbs v. Neighborhood Org. to Rejuvenate Tenant Hous., 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622
(1969).
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cannot be insulated from public criticism. 142 The second category allows
picketing if the residence is the only feasible situs to communicate effec-
tively. 143 Scapegoat picketing involves none of these exigencies. It does not
involve the picketing of government officials, and because the target situs is
unrelated to the dispute, it cannot be the only situs at which effective
communication to the intended audience may be achieved.
Another factor considered by the courts in their balancing process to
determine the permissibility of picketing, is the availability of reasonable
alternatives to ameliorate the protested conditions. In Springfield, Bayside
Corp. v. Hochman, 144 for example, the court stressed that, in the interest of
maintaining a peaceful, orderly society, alternative administrative remedies
should be exhausted before any picketing should be condoned. 14- Similarly, in
People v. Kopezak, 146 in upholding the disorderly conduct convictions of
picketers protesting housing conditions, the court stated that even if the
picketers' grievances were justified, "the conditions of the premises in ques-
tion should be remedied if possible and if not the same should be condemned
by the proper authorities .... [T]he lawful and orderly manner of the tenants
was to file their complaints with one of these departments."'147
Therefore, under the rationale of these cases, if the grievances or disputes
can be remedied administratively, these alternatives should be exhausted
before picketing is permissible. For example, in Rouse Philadelphia Inc. v.
Ad Hoc '78,148 Ad Hoc's grievances were with the government' 4 9 and not
with the department stores at which they conducted the picketing. Thus, the
scapegoat picketers should have been required to exhaust municipal and
federal grievance procedures before their picketing at unrelated sites would be
deemed permissible. Common sense would appear to dictate that the picket-
142. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969). State v. Anonymous. 6 Conn
Cir. 372, 377, 274 A.2d 897, 900 (1971-1972); Flores v. City of Denver, 122 Colo 71, 74. 220
P.2d 373, 376 (1950).
143. E.g., Hibbs v. Neighborhood Org. to Rejuvenate Tenant Hous., 433 Pa 578, 252 A.2d
622 (1969). In Hibbs, the respondent rented houses in low income areas under a fictitious name
and conducted all transactions with tenants by mail through the use of a post office box- All
tenant complaints had to be sent through the mail and consequently, were frequently lost or
delayed. Id. at 579-80, 252 A.2d at 623. To publicize Hibbs's deplorable activities, tenants
conducted informational picketing in front of his home. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed a lower court decree that granted a temporary restraining order. stating that "lblecause
of the secretive manner in which Hibbs was conducting his real estate business there was no other
place to effectively communicate his activities." Id. at 580. 252 A.2d at 623-24, see Lloyd Corp-
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563 (1972); Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539. 543 (10th Cir IJ74), cefrl
denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975); Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94 Misc. 2d 121. 131, 404 N Y S 2d 491.
497-98 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
144. 44 Misc. 2d 882, 255 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
145. Id. at 886, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
146. 153 Misc. 187, 274 N.Y.S 629 (Ct Spec. Sess. 1934, aftfd mem , 266 N V 565, IY5
N.E. 202 (1935).
147. Id. at 189-90, 274 N.Y.S. at 632.
148. Rouse Phila. Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, No. 4145 (C.P. Phila. Co Jan 31. 1979). aft'd, Nos-
380, 390, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 28. 1979). appeal docketed, No. 99 tE.D. Pa. Jan 25. 1980)
149. See note 11 supra.
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ing of an unassociated, unrelated target without resort to administrative
remedies would be attributed even less protection by the courts.
CONCLUSION
It cannot be denied that the American public has the right to protest and to
communicate criticisms of government policies. Yet these rights do not
immunize from regulation and restriction the scapegoat picketers' arbitrary
infliction of economic damage upon uninvolved third parties. Thus, scapegoat
picketing is beyond the pale of constitutional protection.
Robert J. Mongeluzzi
